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Giorgio Agamben’s latest book, ​Karman. A Brief Treatise on Action, Guilt, and Gesture​, is an               
ambitious endeavour. It aims to enfranchise Western ethical and political thought from some             
of ‘the bonds and the signatures that oblige it to proceed almost blindly in one sole - and                  
perhaps inauspicious - direction’ (p. 5), by bringing to the fore one of its conditions of                
possibility. From this perspective, this slender book is a synthesis of Agamben’s entire             
intellectual journey - an impassioned historico-philosophical excavation of the (often          
obscure) cultural frameworks within which contemporary social, ethical and political          
arrangements have emerged. In ​Karman​, the focus is placed on the historical emergence of              
the concept of ‘action’ as a hinge upon which both Western ethics and politics revolve. What                
is an action? According to Agamben, this apparently obvious concept has never been             
satisfactorily defined. Aristotle, Aquinas and Hannah Arendt have all failed in providing a             
convincing definition of ‘action’. In spite of such a conceptual instability, ‘action’ (or ‘praxis’ in               
Aristotle’s lexicon) has been elevated to a crucial ordering principle of the Western             
‘ethical-political machine’ (p. 42). The consequences of such a primacy have been            
(supposedly) wide-ranging. Agamben lingers on one: the centrality of action plays a role in              
the construction of the Western ethical and political subject as an internally ‘split’ entity. This               
construction has doomed Western civilization to enact its own subjection and the Western             
normative thought to enter its current deadlocks. It is against this bleak backdrop than              
Agamben casts his voice. 
  
Karman​’s first strand is legal-philosophical. In order to appreciate the concept of action and              
its relationships with the birth of the Western ethical and political subject, it is necessary to                
interrogate the edifice of law, its structure and functioning. This inquiry is not a historical               
analysis though, but an investigation of the ontological foundations of law and their relations              
with politics and ethics. 
Agamben’s idea of law, echoing Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt, is merely            
reactive/punitive. Law, in fact, is essentially ​sanction​, i.e. permitted violence. This means that             
whenever people get implicated into law, they commit what in ancient Rome was called              
‘crimen’​, i.e. an action imputable or sanctioned by ‘the order of responsibility and law’ (p. 25),                
and as such productive of consequences. Committing a ‘crimen’ equates with crossing the             
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 threshold of law, and entering the sphere of law implies committing a ‘crimen’. Crimen’s              
etymology is surprising: it seems to derive from ​‘karman’​, the Sanskrit word at the heart of                
Buddhist philosophy. ‘Karman’, in fact, means simply ‘action linked with a consequence’ as             
‘the law of karman’ is the mere idea that actions will produce consequences. 
Agamben emphasises that when people’s actions get sanctioned by law, however, it is             
people in their entirety who are subjected to legal violence (not just their ‘crimen’), becoming               
themselves ​culpable​. Agamben - evoking Kafka - reflects on such a mysterious process, by              
which culpable actions make a whole human culpable, within law. This leap is inconceivable              
unless it is introduced an element which further clarifies law’s violent nature: the ‘alien              
power’ (p. 6) of punishment. Punishment is a kind of ontological invariant in law, i.e. there is                 
no law without punishment. The counterintuitive claim here, is that punishment makes            
possible the legal judgement and therefore the very possibility of being culpable. Outside the              
legal sphere there is not culpable action (and culpable actor), but just radical innocence; it is                
only the presence of the legal judgement (and punishment) at the end of the legal process                
which renders retrospectively a human culpable. As a consequence, the only way to escape              
culpability is to not get implicated into law at all - a daunting mission since, in Agamben’s                 
view, law is an underlying component of any Western social and political arrangement. 
The significance of this discussion resides in the fact that the process of displacing              
culpability from the action to the actor within law, will provide the Western normative thought               
with a blueprint for imagining the nature of the ethical and political subject. 
  
The legal process, however, is only a very preliminary condition for this model of subject to                
emerge. The interiorization of culpability is, in fact, a historical phenomenon which dates             
back to the Christian theological invention of ‘free will’ via a certain interpretation of              
Aristotle’s ethics (chapter 3). 
‘Free will’ is a concept ignored by Greeks and absent in the Bible. In Ancient Greek                
philosophy, in fact, primacy is given to human potential. An action is culpable because one is                
able to act not because one ​wills an action. The intellectualistic ethics of Socrates - ‘no one                 
does evil voluntarily’ - exemplifies this position (p. 31). 
Christian theology (particularly Augustine) breaks with any intellectualist ethics by          
re-elaborating the Aristotelian theory of action. In the Nicomachean Ethics​, Aristotle,           
criticising Socrates, engages with the task of guaranteeing the imputability of action to an              
agent, finding in the concept of ‘proairesis’ - choosing - the mechanism by which ‘rendering               
people responsible for their actions and indissolubly joining the action to its actor’ (p. 37).               
This mechanism secures the paternity to one’s action as a condition for an individualising              
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 ethics and politics. The Greek tragedy dramatises this idea, by casting characters as             
shadows of actions. 
Christian theology inscribes into this Aristotelian-tragic paradigm the idea of free will            
(‘​liberum arbitrium’) ​(p. 47) i.e. the will to choose between good or evil. This means that the                 
dyad good/evil is grafted onto an imputable action, making possible the very idea of sin.               
Agamben contends that this ‘will-apparatus’ (p. 44) ultimately aims to make masterable what             
humans can do, shifting the focus from ‘potential’ to ‘will’, marking the ‘passage from the               
ancient world to modernity’ (p. 49). As a consequence, from then onward, the being will be                
thought as a mere shadow of freely willed actions (p. 39). In this way, by drawing a fracture                  
between being and acting, the Western ethical-political machine splits internally its subject. 
At this point, it is perhaps clearer where Agamben is heading. The interiorization of              
culpability as a consequence of freely willed actions, is nothing but the precursor of the idea                
of individual responsibility. Agamben highlights how responsibility, far from igniting any           
expansive dynamic of freedom, ‘limit[s] the divine potential and anarchy’ (p. 58) of humans,              
by insinuating duty into ethics, creating possibility for their external direction and control. 
  
There is a final condition for the Western ethical and political subject to arise. This is the idea                  
that the culpable and willing subject acts always with an end or purpose (p. 63), its action is                  
always instrumental. 
This qualification is linked with Aristotle’s distinction between ​poiesis and ​praxis​, and its             
popularization. In the ​Nicomachean Ethics​, Aristotle aims to define the distinctive human            
‘good’ or happiness (​eudaimonia​). He claims that this good ‘cannot be [...] a means for               
something other than itself’ (p. 62). The human good is a good for the sake of itself,                 
self-sufficient and complete. Agamben argues that Aristotle is basically inserting into the            
doctrine of good an idea of end that ‘can never become a means for the sake of something                  
else with respect to which everything else is configured as a means’ (p. 63). The               
taken-for-granted idea that the end of each action is the good pursued by the actor, is                
apparently informed by Aristotle’s understanding of the human good. This is a critical move,              
since it ends up separating and opposing ends and means in the theory of good,               
establishing human actions (‘praxis’) as mere means and never ends, a mere actualization             
of the only (external) end-good. As a consequence, a deeper ontological ‘fracture and a gap’               
(p. 63) between human beings and their good is drawn. The good does not lie into the                 
human but in the outer world and from this springs the compulsion to act. This implies also                 
an ontological reduction of the human (​pace Arendt), now deprived of his good and doomed               
to a Kafkian pursuit of an external ever-shifting grail. Action will be the instrument to fill this                 
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 gap, to proceed toward the human good, and as a consequence, acting and not being will be                 
the place of Western ethics and politics. 
In this way, Agamben, with a coup de théâtre (at least for those who have not followed his                  
recent intellectual endeavours), denounces as misleading one of the most successful           
formulas of political theory, distancing himself from Aristotle, for decades one of his main              
sources of inspiration. The rediscovery of Plato is the counterpart of this critique. Particularly,              
Agamben maintains that for Plato the good is not an end, but a principle to be appreciated                 
by knowledge and contemplation. Plato does not aim to substitute the ​polis ​with the ​oikos​, as                
Arendt polemically argued, but to imagine a model of politics - ‘a playful politics’ (p. 68) -                 
which escapes instrumentality and the displacement of the good from the human to the              
external world. 
  
Agamben’s hypothesis is intriguing: a legal-theological apparatus at heart of the Western            
ethical-political machine aims to secure paternity for human actions, by postulating a subject             
culpable, willful and end-oriented. This subject lacks of potentiality, since its good lies             
outside itself. Specularly, not every human deed is an ethically and politically significant             
action, but only the instrumental, willful and responsible pursuit of an ‘external’ good. In this               
framework, both actions and their subjects are ultimately rendered masterable or controllable            
‘externally’ and the power of contemplation (i.e. the opposite of action) is disqualified.             
Against this conceptual infrastructure Agamben mobilises a singular alliance between Walter           
Benjamin and Buddha. 
Buddha’s teaching on the impermanence of the agent (who is just the retrospective             
connection between actions) breaks the link between action, will and imputability, uncovering            
the fictional character of Western ethical and political subject. Buddha’s revelation is to             
re-think the subject as independent from its action, breaking the identification action-subject.            
This means fundamentally to recover the original meaning of ‘karman’, i.e. the pure             
connection between actions and consequences devoid of any obscure presupposition of           
subjectivity. It then entails an ontological critique of the interiorization of culpability as a              
condition for the Western subject to arise. The responsible subject, in fact, ultimately is ‘only               
an appearance due to ignorance or imagination’ (p. 78). 
According to Agamben, this teaching resonates with Benjamin’s idea of ‘​mediality’ ​(1996):            
the only action to be recovered is the ‘pure mean’ which denies the possibility of violence as                 
a means to a just end. ​Gesture is the new political category whereby means are               
emancipated from ends, imputability and will. This concept, already present in ​Language and             
Death ​(1982), is now further elaborated. In that early work, Agamben denounced the             
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 destruction of experience as a mark of contemporary age, mainly due to the split between               
subject of experience and of knowledge. Gesture, as third mode of human activity, can              
bridge this fracture by overcoming the ‘false alternative between making that is always a              
means directed toward an end - production - and an action that has an its end in itself -                   
praxis - but also above all that between an action without a work and a necessarily operative                 
action’ (p. 84). Gesture is the operation which de-activates human works, rendering them             
inoperative and therefore opening them to new possible uses. Gestures cannot be imputed             
to a subject, i.e. it do not create any subject, whilst actually generating spaces for freedom                
and endless re-invention. ‘Inoperativity’ is a keyword here, being the general framework            
under which gestures make sense. Inoperative is ‘the space - provisional and at the same               
time non-temporal, localised and at the same time extra-territorial - that is opened when the               
apparatuses that link human actions in the connection of means and ends, of imputation and               
fault, of merit and demerit, are rendered inoperative. It is, in this sense, a politics of pure                 
means’ (p. 85). This means to re-discover the sphere of human pure potentiality, whose              
infinite possibility no action could exhaust. 
How would such gestures look like? Agamben does not offer detailed examples, pointing             
merely to one category of human activity, performative arts. In dance, for instance,             
movements are not means to move a body, they actually neutralise - render inoperative - the                
body movement toward a new horizon of sense (poetry could be another example of gesture               
de-activating the informational structure of language). 
  
In ​Karman​, buried under a dense erudition, lies a straightforward (and bleak) moral: until the               
Western normative imagination will hinge upon responsible, instrumental and individually          
imputable actions there will not be hope for a radically new politics and ethics. 
Therefore, a critique of action is not only a critique of the market-oriented (instrumental and               
productive) conduct at the heart of the neoliberal governmentality but also of the Marxist              
concept of ‘praxis’ as revolutionary action which aims to negate or seize upon ‘the’ power.               
Both, in fact, reproduce the established power’s violence, just in different shapes and             
opposite directions. Both are instances of the dialectic between constituting power (or            
violence that makes the law, in Benjamin’s jargon) and constituted power (or violence that              
preserves the law), that is, ontologically flawed attempts to free political life from sovereignty              
and to break the cycle of violence. 
A further implication pertains to the critique of the legal logics of politics. A critique of the                 
sovereign paradigm of politics requires a critique of law. The legal framework makes humans              
controllable by hypothesising free will and imputing individual responsibility for their actions            
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 as a first step toward an exclusive inclusion of their entire life into law. Humans implicated in                 
law are exposed unconditionally to the possibility of elimination as it happens            
paradigmatically (and dramatically) to Guantanamo detainees or prospective asylum seekers          
stranded in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Karman could also be translated into a contestation of the very idea of citizenship as a                
political device. The apparently obvious ascription of humans since their birth to a state, with               
its laws and political system, is just another cog of the sovereign apparatus which              
incessantly captures and exploits human life. It is as if the birth were a freely willed action,                 
whose consequences are allocated to the newborn, culpable for the rest of his/her life. 
  
Overall​, ​this book condenses some of the basic ideas characterising Agamben’s entire work.             
The element of novelty, here, is that Agamben elaborates on Benjamin’s alternative between             
violence which creates law and violence which preserves law by evoking Plato’s playful             
politics and Buddha’s teachings on the human impermanence. There is something           
profoundly ‘humanist’ about this endeavour, its aim: eliminating the fracture between           
humans and their good, by locating the latter back within the being. In this way, Agamben                
seeks to restore humans’ radical self-sufficiency and innocence. This can be interpreted as a              
specimen of Agamben’s long-lasting struggle against the sovereign apparatuses which          
capture human life and neutralise human potential. This is not an escape from power; it is                
about deciding to not play by the rules set by the (sovereign) power and re-imagining new                
possibilities to generate different rules, whereby ‘play’ is not a mere metaphor. At least              
partly, this resonates not only with Benjamin critique of the relationship between violence,             
law and justice, but also with Michel Foucault’s ethico-political struggle against subjection            
and for subjectivation (as also made clear in Agamben’s ​The Use of Bodies ​(2016)). 
Karman confirms both Agamben’s creativity and his oft-lamented limitations.         
Methodologically, it’s difficult to say where the conceptual diagram ends and the            
historiographical thesis begins (and vice versa). Agamben’s work entails continuous          
interferences between temporal and epistemic fields, which appear at times (deliberately?)           
disorientating. Another methodological issue is that the philological approach used as an            
interpretive key may be accused of mere nominalism. There is a recurrent leap from the               
history of words to the essence of what they designate, from philology to ontology.              
Conceptually, Agamben’s critique of law is also controversial. A merely punitive           
understanding of law à la Schmitt or Nietzsche, is at least monolithic since it completely               
overlooks (and avoids the dialogue with) the idea of legal order as a bottom-up social               
phenomenon, as argued by pluralist and institutional theories of law (e.g. Romano, 2017).             
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 Finally, it is likely that charges of political passivity once again will be pressed against his                
platonic (and Heideggerian) ‘appeal to being’ as an overcoming of the primacy of action. In               
Karman, ​as in Agamben’s recent works, there is no track of those concepts (praised by               
Marxists) which did appear to embrace a transformation of the world: the ‘coming             
community’ and ‘whatever singularity’ featuring Agamben’s 1990s works (1993). Additionally,          
there are no politically situated voices in his ontological account, but an abstract space of               
smooth and mute political antagonism whose reconciliation lies in the being. 
All these limitations have a distinctive (and possibly frustrating) feature: they seem to be              
deliberately pursued. And perhaps here is the issue with Agamben: there is something             
paradoxically ​totalising in his work, partly down to his methodological and normative hubris.             
Agamben re-enacts an overwhelming reality which resembles those Nietzschean monsters          
of modernity (e.g. sovereignty) targeted by his work, letting the empty abyss of modernity              
gaze into the reader, impassionately. 
Agamben’s work has never provided ‘solutions’, but deliberately incomplete attempts to open            
up new fields of possibility, where new problems emerge and old ones morph into              
increasingly uncanny and disquieting figures, like in Francis Bacon’s paintings. ​Karman does            
more than gesturing at vague possibilities though, it points to directions, Agamben’s old             
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